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INTRODUCTION 
ORGANIZING MONEY 
By Robert Creamer 
In the last year, the Chicago based Citizens Action Program (CAP) Congress of Community 
Organizations has pioneered a new organizing technique that gives local community organizations 
the ability to permanently appropriate considerable power over the future of their neighborhoods. 
This technique is rooted in the understanding that the decisions that most significantly affect 
the state of communities are financial. They are investment decisions made by Savings & Loans, 
Banks, insurance companies, large land developers and realtors. 
Simply put, the strategy involves the recruitment of thousands of pledges from community 
residents that they will allow financial institutions to have access to their savings deposits only if 
they use these deposits to shape the community according to their desires. This procedure, known 
as "greenlining" was originally developed to deal with mortgage redlining, whereby institutions 
arbitrarily withdraw mortgage capital from certain communities. 
THE DISINVESTMENT PROBLEM 
Thousands of people in Chicago invest savings every year in local Banks and Savings & Loans. 
Over 13 billion dollars are invested in Savings & Loans alone and these dollars provide the bulk of 
mortgage financing in the Chicago area. 
For years, Banks and Savings & Loans have had a free hand to determine exactly where money 
would be invested - regardless of the needs of the communities from which they get their savings. 
The result has been a net outflow of housing capital from the older neighborhoods of the City, and 
a virtual bleeding dry of mortgage capital from neighborhoods threatened with racial instability. 
Frequently, financial institutions have engaged in the practice of overt redlining -drawing a 
red line around communities where they hilve decided to curtail or completely cut off new invest· 
ment. Areas that are solid, viable communities are often red lined because· mortgage institutions 
decide that in the long run they are "bad riskS:'. However, this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Without mortgage funds, home improvement loans, and commercial loans, the community does, 
in fact, deteriorate. 
Of course, the result of this practice in racially changing areas can be complete re·segregation. 
When conventional mortgage money is withdrawn from a changing area, panic sets in. Since 
potential buyers and sellers cannot get anything but FHA insured mortgages, the door is opened 
for unscrupulous mortgage bankers and panic peddlers to completely turn over huge areas using 
several much abused sections of the FHA housing laws. The result is millions of dollars in profits 
for mortgage banking firms, and realtors; but it is also the loss of thousands of dollars in property 
values to current and former residents, the exploitation of thousands of new buyers who pay 
exorbitant prices, huge rates of home abandonment, and enormous racial hatred. 
Disinvestment, however, may take more subtle forms. In periods of tight money there 
simply isn't as much mortgage money to go around. So older neighborhoods that didn't get much 
money when credit was abundant, don't get any when it is scarce. 
During the first nine months of 1974, thousands of potential city home buyers were told 
that mortgages were unavailable because money was tight, or that 50-60% downpayments would 
be necessary. And money certainly was tight. The 1.3 billion dollars in conventional mortgages 
made in the' Chicago area over that period was considerably under the amount made in the same 
period in 1973. Yet, the fact remains that loans were made. And most of them were made in the 
far suburbs and in condominium developments along the posh lakefront. Throughout this period, 
homes and developments were continually advertised in these areas at low interest rates and 5·10% 
down payments. 
In other words, the limited amount of money that was available was all going outside of the 
communities that generated the savings. One of the major causes of this phenomenon is the 
process whereby Savings & loans give large package forward commitments to big developers six 
months or a year before mortgage money is needed. Through this procedure, large suburban 
developers get all of the money they need before the individual home buyer even gets to enter the 
market. 
Other disinvestment techniques are commonplace. Some institutions will not give mortgages 
on frame houses- even though all of some neighborhoods are frame. Or, institutions will not give 
mortgages on less than 35 foot lots, even though huge areas of cities have smaller than 35 foot lots. 
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THE GREENLJNING RESPONSE 
In facing the problem of neighborhood deterioration, the Citizens Action Program has 
developed a systematic response·-· a strategy for forcing financial institutions to meet their 
obligations tothe communities where they get their savings. This strategy, known as "greenlining" 
involves organizing the savers' dollars through pledges. Savers pledge to invest savings only in 
institutions which agree to shoulder their share of the mortgage demand in the community. These 
pledges are then used as the ba.sis to negotiate contractual agreements with lending institutions 
for specific levels of reinvestment into the community. The agreements are renewable on a yearly 
basis. 
Currently, over $50 million in pledges has been recruited from over 13,000 people in Chicago. 
These pledges were collected over a six month period through canvassing in local neighborhoods 
and recruitment through churches and other institut1ons. Individual community organizations 
which are members of the CAP Anti-Deterioration Coalition are now entering into negotiations 
with financial institutions for contracts. Simultaneously, the citywide coalition is beginning discus-
sions with downtown Savings & Loans. 
The target date for the completion of the first major organizing drive is April 6, 1975 - the 
date of the citywide CAP Congress Convention. At that point. the 4,000 delegates will determine 
a strategy for enforcing these agreements. The Convention will determine which institutions will 
be targeted as examples of those which have failed to sign contracts, and pledge signers will be 
asked to move their savings from those institutions to o~hers which have come to terms. 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ALLOWINC FOR THE SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF THE 
GREENUNING STRATEGY 
Obviously any strategy involving the organization of money will only succeed if the 
amount of money which it is possible to organize is adequate to seriously affect target insti-
tutions. Sevr.ral circumstances have allowed fCir the success to date of the Chicago Greenlining 
drive: 
' 1 ).It is not necessary when dealing with financial intermediaries such as Banks or Savings 
& Loans to organize a substantial portion of the total assets of any given institutions or the 
industry as a whole. Rather the organization must gain control only over a large percentage of 
the institution's liquid assets for some limited time period. About 17% of the assets of the average 
Savings & Loan are liquid in any given year (or about 4.25% for any quarter). If a high percentage 
of the pledges of savers in target institutions can actually be implemented over a quarter, then the 
amount of pledges needed to seriously affect the institution need not be terribly high. 
The current credit shortage -- particularly in mortgage capital -has increased the power 
of savers to affect institutiorns with a limited number of pledges. Of course, for a $100 million 
institution, 5% of total insti~utional assets still represents $5 million in pledges from about 1250 
pledgees (the average saving~ account in the Chicago area is about $4,000). 
2). Throughout Illinois thr.re is sharp and constant competition for savings among institutions 
since chartering practices are relatively liberal. This gives potential savers a variety of options 
among a number of relatively convenient institutions, so that the pledgee is more willing to move 
his or her savings from one institution to another. In some states, like Michigan, chartering 
practices are considerably more restrictive and competition is therefore less pronounced. 
3). The withdrawal of savings accounts from Savings & Loans is a fairly simple and uncostly 
proposition from the standpoint of the saver-pledgee. S&L accounts are, of course, passbook 
accounts and are therefore less withdrawable than bank demand deposits, but they are still easy 
enough to withdraw to make the threat credible. The percentage of pledgees who actually 
implement their pledges is maximized by concentrating on a few target institutions as examples 
and following up on all pledges in these institutions through mail and personal contact. 
Also the ease of transfer is increased because forms are available which allow the transfer 
of funds from one S&L to another entirely by mail. 
Most importantly, of course, savers are not being asked to remove their savings so rapidly 
that they will lose any interest. A principle rr~quisite of i!!! monHy organizing strategies is to assure 
that it will cost the participants as little as possible in the short run. 
4). The managements of Savings & Loans and Banks ·-· particularly at the neighborhood level ··· 
are deeply concerned that once a highly publicized program asking pledgees to move their savings 
from the institution were initiated, many other non-pledgee savers would jump on the bandwagon. 
As a result they fear that they might lose deposits far in excess of the amount pledged. While 
organizations should not depend on this effect for their bargaining power, it certainly does increase 
the credibility of the greenlining tacti'~-
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5) Illinois law has historic01i·,: prevented the development of a few dominant chain Banks or 
Savings & Loans with many br<iw.he:;. Peoole therefore have a sense of ·-nany Banks and S&L's 
as neighborhood institutions. Rr<. :'ents are able to love or hate specifir: neighborhood institutions 
much more than they would lovF c·< hate the neighborhoo-d office of a l<1celess metropolitan-wide 
Bank. 
6) In each neighborhood wlr()r' the pledge drive has been conductrd, the drive itself had been 
preceded by other types of activiu.;:, sJeared toward making the residents aware of the redlining 
issue. In many areas this included ·1 rear long campaign for disclosure of lending information, 
confrontation of savings and loan ,-,1 '<cials, public hearings, and demonst:·crtions. Of course, as the 
issue has become better understo( rJ 1 hroughout the city, less lead time has become necessary to 
kick off specific community drive;. 
Other areas which adopt 'hF greenlining approach might not havr; exactly the same list of 
conditions as Chicago. Certainly 1 ,;, 3l areas in Illinois· are very similar E,:J1 one thing should 
always be kept in mind: before ,. ' ·: ··•ng i:l_!!Y money organizing stratAfl'1 " serious analysis should 
be undertaken to find out just h1'W·' r:" •ch money is needed to have an i mpar.t, and whether the 
organization has the ability to recrutl that number of pledges. 
FORMULATING DEMANDS 
For a campaign of the type de~c·ibed above to prevent disinvestnwnt, contract demands must 
be carefully developed and ironclad. fhe following is an outline of the demand formulation. 
Determining Mortgage Demand For A Given Area 
Cook County maintains precise records of yearly home turnover and market price for each of 
400 neighborhoods throughout the county. This data (supplemented by census data and data from 
the Society of Real Estate Appraisers SREA) allows CAP to determine exactly how much money 
is needed to finance the home sales that occur each year in each community. 
Defining The Community Area 
Each organization determines exactly how to define its own area. Neighboring areas crucial 
to community stability, as well as sub-area's vulnerable to deterioration are specifically designated. 
Determining How Much Of The Demand In Each Area Given Institution Should Meet 
First, the dollar demand in the community will be divided between each institution in the 
market area in proportion to the assets of each institution. The bigger the institution, the more 
money it would be asked to put back into the neighborhood. 
Secondly, a rider is attached to each local agreement to the effect that their proportion of 
reinvestment in the immediate community could be reduced in direct proportion to the number of 
agreements CAP can get from the central area Savings & Loans. These central area (downtown) 
Savings & Loans control about 20% of the assets in ttie metropolitan area and should shoulder the 
responsibility for 20% of the demand in each geographic area. But there is no guarantee at the 
beginning of negotiations that they will do so. Therefore, CAP demands that!!!! demands be met 
by the local area institutions to help get agreements with the downtown institutions. This procedure, 
of course, could be modified where a high proportion of savings from an area goes to downtown 
institutions. 
Determining Which Financial Institutions Are In Each Local Market Area 
The institutions included in local market areas are chosen mainly on the basis that they get a 
great deal of savings from the community. 
Determining How Much Mortgage Money Should Be Made Available By Banks 
Banks, unlike Savings & Loans, do not make most of their investment in real estate loans. In 
some communities (like the southwest side), they meet virtually none of the mortgage demand. In 
others, they make considerably more. On the average the Federal Reserve Board indicates that 
Banks make approximately 5.6% of their total assets available for home mortgarJeS. 
At a minimum CAP demands that every Bank CAP considers important make at least this 
percentage of its total assets available for mortgages. 
To determine the proportion of demand in a community that a bank should shoulder, CAP 
treats a $100 million Bank that did not make any mortgages at all like $5.6 million Savings & Loan. 
Where a $100 million Bank puts 20% of its assets into mortgages, CAP treats it like a $20 million 
dollar Savings & Loan. In other words, a $100 million Savings & Loan would be expected to 
shoulder five times more mortgage demand than a $100 million Bank that puts 20% of its assets 
into mortgages. 
Before beginning negotiations with banks, however, CAP is developing other additional 
demands for redevelopment funds, small business loans, and home improvement loans - since 
this is the area in which the bank would be most likely to contribute to the welfare of the 
neighborhoods. 
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Is CAP Asking Only That A Financial Institution Make Mortgages "Available" To The Community? 
No. CAP is asking that the institution actually invest a specific dollar amount in the 
community over the period of one year. The local organization knows how much demand there 
is for mortgages in each area. The Savings & Loan or Bank cannot argue that there isn't enough 
demand in an area to support the dollar figure it has requested. This is especially true in this 
period of tight mortgage money. · 
Additional Demands 
Aside from the basic demand that the institutions meet conventional mortgage demand in 
neighborhoods, several other elements are included in any contract or agreement CAP negotiates: 
- Affirmative Lending Policy. Each institution is required to invest the same number of 
advertising dollars in informing the neighborhood of the availability of home mortgages as they 
spend trying to generate savings from the community. 
- Terms. The average downpayment, nominal interest rate, effective interest rate (after 
points, etc.) and length of term fall within very close limits to the averages for all mortgages made 
in the six county area. The Federal Home Loan Bank Economics Department maintains public 
records of these averages. 
- Redevelopment. In each local area, organizations may wish to add specific dollar demands, 
over and above normal conventional loan demand, for money that would go into redevelopment 
programs. 
Other Provisions 
It is necessary to include clauses in any agreement With the financial institutions which allow 
an adjustment -either up or down - of actual dollars to be invested in a community in the event 
that after six months of the year long agreement, the records of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds 
indicates that demand has either increased or dropped by more than say 5% from the expected level. 
This could easily be incorporated in any contract. 
Examples Of Possible Demands By Specific Organizations On Specific Savings & Loan Associations 
Southwest Federation: Demand $24,663, 518 
Savings From 
Savings & Loan Primary Service Area 
Talman 
Chicago Savings 
Gage Park " 
Republic Federal 
Crawford 
Lawn Manor 
SW Federal 
$329.499,654 
53,254,833 
12,732,248 
53,508,872 
41,676,734 
9,880,000 
13,134,382 
%' 
64.1 
10.3 
2.4 
10.4 
8.1 
1.9 
2.5 
TOTAL $513,68,6,723 100.0 
I 
North Austin: Demand $12,995,104 
Savings & Loan 
Austin Federal 
St. Paul 
1st Federal S&L 
of Schaumburg 
Sterling 
TOTAL 
Assets 
$ 87,243,806 
233,369,502 
13,133,187 
41.422,320 
$375,168,815 
MONITORING THE AGREEMENTS 
% 
23.2 
62.2 
3.4 
11.0 
99.8 
$Share Of Demand 
$15,809,315 
2,540,342 
591.924 
2,565,005 
1,997,744 
468,606 
616,587 
$24,663,518 
$ Share of Demand 
$ 3,041,864 
8,082.954 
441,833 
1.429.461 
$12,995,104 
Actual Investment 
$5,828,230 
399,280 
Each institution must agree to provide quarterly, CPA verified disclosure of lending and 
savings distribution. Geographic areas broken out by the institution must be specific enough to 
assure that the agreement is b'eing complied with. 
Disclosure for this monitoring should include: dollar amount and number of both loans and 
savings deposits for each geographic area covered by the agreement, for other areas of the city not 
covered by the agreement, and for the suburbs; nominal and effective interest rates by area; down· 
payment and length of term by area; dollar amounts spent on advertising intended to attract savings 
in the area and that which is intended to inform the community of the availability of mortgage loans 
in the community. 
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POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF MONEY ORGANIZING STRATEGIES 
The greenlining strategy is significant because it recognizes that the forces which shape the 
future of neighborhoods are primarily economic - not racial, and to a large extent not even 
political. Through the greenlining project, and other related projects to reform FHA, CAP has been 
successful at uniting white and black community groups -even in changing neighborhoods -against 
the common enemies of those communities: large financial institutions. 
Just as important, however, the greenlining concept could very well provide the same kind of 
power for community organizing that the strike weapon has provided the labor movement. It gives 
people the ability to organize the capital generated by their savings and allows its use only for 
purposes which serve their interests. 
So far this type of organized money power has been used mainly to assure that demand for 
mortgage funds are met in communities. The most immediate extension of the program would be 
to assure that home improvement loans, commercial loans to small businessmen and redevelopment 
loans for specific projects are available. 
Developing specific dollar demands in these areas is a much more subjective process and will 
require research on a community by community basis. 
The policies of various other institutions which affect communities could also be addressed 
using this technique. For instance, many insurance companies discriminate against certain areas in 
their rate structure. It is possible that programs might be developed to organize insurance 
consumers in the area and to give business only to companies which give the community favorable 
treatment. 
Adaptations of money organizing to other areas must, of course, be done quite carefully, 
and systematically. The specific program must make sense to potential pledgees and the economics 
of the industry or institution in question must be such that the potentially organizable money 
can have an impact. ' 
The investment policies of some institutions- including insurance companies and mortgage 
bankers -are not of course so immediately subject to the type of savings organizing described 
above. The possibility of affecting even these institutions, however, should not be set aside as 
organizing of this sort expands around the country. 
The organization of a community's capital resources could be a fundamental new departure 
in community organization. If it works, real community control over a number of the decisions 
that affect neighborhoods may be a real possibility. 
The author ltus heen Associate Director oF the Citi::ens Action Pru,~?ram (CAP) Co11J!ress of 
CC1lllP711Hiity Organi::ations i11 Chicago for the last se!'er,ll years and was staFf co-ordinator for tile 
Greenlining Drive described in this paper. 
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